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SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON: SOLVING AN AGE-
OLD PROBLEM?
Adam N. Bitter+
To Azel Smith and other Jackson, Mississippi police officers and dis-
patchers, the city's new pay plan appeared unjust.' Although the pay
plan announced across-the-board salary increases for all officers and dis-
patchers, the numbers told a different story.2 The raises appeared to ad-
versely affect police personnel with more than five years of tenure. In
fact, one expert concluded that the pay increases for newly hired officers
younger than forty years of age were four standard deviations greater
than pay increases for older officers.
After the city of Jackson adopted its new pay plan, Azel Smith and the
other officers and dispatchers brought suit under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act (ADEA), claiming disparate treatment' and dispa-
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expertise during the writing process, and the Catholic University Law Review staff and
editors for their immeasurable work in the production of this article. And to Sandra, for
her inspiration, patience, and for making every day a classic.
1. See Brief of Appellants at 5-8, Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir.
2003) (No. 02-60850).
2. See id. at4.
3. Id.
4. Id. After further investigation, the officers learned that the new pay plan was the
city's second failed attempt to raise the salaries of its officers and dispatchers. See id. at 5.
Five months earlier, the city adopted a pay plan purporting to give salary increases to all of
its employees. Id. As the officers alleged, however, there was a significant problem with
the earlier plan: officers with more than five years of tenure received no pay increase at all.
Id. Instead, the pay increase applied only to younger, newly hired police officers. Id.
Even worse, the older officers contended that the city provided an erroneous payroll
analysis in an effort to hide the disparity in pay increases between older and younger offi-
cers. Id.
5. Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (1967) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 29 U.S.C.).
6. Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 544 U.S. 228
(2005). Defining the disparate treatment model, the Supreme Court has stated: "The
employer simply treats some people less favorably than others because of their [protected
characteristic]. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment .... " International Brother-
hood of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,335 n.15 (1977).
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rate impact.7 In their disparate treatment claim, the plaintiffs alleged that
several city employees made age-biased comments, and that the city con-
cealed information regarding the new pay plan.8 In their disparate impact
claim, the plaintiffs alleged that the city's new pay plan, by focusing on
years of tenure, adversely affected police personnel over forty years of
age.9 Although the Fifth Circuit had not previously ruled on the avail-
ability of disparate impact recovery under the ADEA, ° the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the similarities between the ADEA and Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act11 supported the applicability of the disparate impact model.1
2
Moreover, the plaintiffs contended that the city failed to prove that busi-
ness necessity justified its salary increases, 13 as required by Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) regulations. 4
In response, the city asserted that its new pay plan sought to increase
the starting salaries of police officers to the regional average. 5 Similarly,
7. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d at 186. The Supreme Court has noted that disparate
impact claims "involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of
different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be
justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive... is not required under a
disparate-impact theory." Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 336 n.15. In a disparate impact claim,
plaintiffs often introduce statistical evidence to demonstrate the effects of facially neutral
employment practices across a group of employees. E.g., Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d
1027, 1030 (2d Cir. 1980) (admitting statistical evidence demonstrating that, under the
defendant employer's hiring policies, a person over forty years of age had a substantially
lower chance of being selected for a teaching position than a person under forty years of
age); see BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & DAVID D. KADUE, AGE DISCRIMINATION IN
EMPLOYMENT LAW 581 (2003); see also Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S.
977, 994-95 (1988) (plurality opinion) (holding, in a Title VII case, that statistical dispari-
ties must be "sufficiently substantial" to draw an inference that the employment practice
causes an adverse impact).
8. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 7.
9. See Brief of the Petitioners at 5, Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005) (No.
03-1160).
10. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d at 184.
11. Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000)).
12. See Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 15-16. As the plaintiffs noted, the two
statutes contain nearly identical substantive provisions and share the common goal of
eradicating employment discrimination. Id.; see also Laura C. Marino, Note, A Necessary
Tool: The Continuing Debate Over the Viability of Disparate Impact Claims Under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 77 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 649, 666 (2003) (noting the
similarities in the congressional purposes and substantive provisions of Title VII and the
ADEA).
13. Brief of Appellants, supra note 1, at 17-19.
14. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2006) (applying the business necessity defense to an
ADEA disparate impact claim).
15. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005). In defense of its plan, the
city contended that it sought to "'attract and retain qualified people, provide incentive for
performance, maintain competitiveness with other public sector agencies and ensure equi-
table compensation to all employees regardless of age, sex, race and/or disability."' Id
(emphasis added).
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the city disputed the plaintiffs' evidence of age-biased comments, arguing
that city employees referred only to officers' tenure of service, not to
their age. 6 As to the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim, the city acknowl-
edged that the pay plan affected employees differently based on their
age, as the plan focused on the threshold of five years of tenure. Ac-
cordingly, the city asserted that it complied with the ADEA by using a
reasonable factor other than age (RFOA).18 In addition, the city con-
tended that it was not required to demonstrate business necessity because
such a defense applied only to disparate impact claims, which the city
asserted could not be brought under the ADEA.19
The district court granted summary judgment for the city on each of the
plaintiffs' claims.20 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of
the disparate impact claim,2' holding that the ADEA does not authorize
such recovery.22 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that an employer could not
be held liable under the ADEA where it used an RFOA, regardless of
the adverse effect of the employment policy or practice on older work-
23
ers.
16. See Brief of Appellees at 10-11, Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183 (5th Cir.
2003) (No. 02-60850).
17. See id. at 2-3. The City noted that the pay plan included three categories of em-
ployees:
(1) [Tjhose officers and dispatchers with less than five years of tenure, most if not all,
of whom would have been under 40 years of age; (2) those 40 years of age or older,
most, if not all, of whom would have had more than five years of tenure, and; (3)
those under 40 years of age with more than five years of tenure.
Id. at3.
18. See id. at 6. Under the ADEA, it is lawful for an employer to adopt an otherwise
prohibited employment practice "where the differentiation is based on reasonable factors
other than age." 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000) (RFOA provision). Since the passage of the
ADEA, there has been considerable debate about whether the RFOA provision precludes
disparate impact liability or whether it merely serves as an affirmative defense to a dispa-
rate impact claim. See infra Part I.C.4.
19. See Brief of Appellees, supra note 16, at 8-9.
20. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 231 (2005). By dismissing the case at the
summary judgment stage, the district court applied the then-majority view that the ADEA
did not authorize disparate impact claims. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d
1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the employer because
"disparate impact claims may not be brought under the ADEA"); Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,
164 F.3d 696, 703-04, 706 (1st Cir. 1999) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim at
the summary judgment stage, and reasoning that the ADEA does not authorize disparate
impact recovery).
21. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 195 (5th Cir. 2003). However, the Fifth
Circuit ruled that the district court improperly dismissed the disparate treatment claim at
the summary judgment stage. Id. at 198.
22. Id. at 195.
23. See id. at 189-93 (arguing that the RFOA exception provides employers with a
"safe harbor" from liability under the ADEA).
2007]
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On appeal, a majority of the United States Supreme Court-in a splin-
tered opinion-announced that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact
recovery.2a The Court, however, affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff's
disparate impact claim, as the Court held that the city met its burden of
demonstrating the use of a reasonable, non-age factor 5 Justice Stevens,
writing for a plurality of the Court, contended that disparate impact re-
covery is cognizable under the ADEA, pointing to the Act's substantive
prohibitions and its similarities with Title VII)5 In a concurring opinion,
Justice Scalia agreed that disparate impact recovery is available under the
ADEA, but based his opinion on deference to the EEOC's interpreta-
21tions of the Act. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices Thomas and
Kennedy, concurred in the judgment only, contending that disparate im-
pact theory is inapplicable to the ADEA because of the Act's RFOA
provision and legislative history.2
Age discrimination suits number in the thousands every year and take
many different forms.29 For example, plaintiffs often allege that an em-
ployer's practice of hiring "recent college graduates" or persons with par-
ticular levels of experience adversely affects older applicants. 30 Similarly,
employees may allege that an employer's reduction in force (RIF) ad-
versely affects older workers because the reduction tends to dismiss em-
ployees whose salaries have increased over long tenures. In fact, plain-
24. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 229, 240, 243. Chief Justice Rehnquist did not partici-
pate in the City of Jackson decision. Id. at 243.
25. Id. at 243. The Court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to identify a specific dis-
criminatory employment practice. Id. at 241. In addition, the Court held that the City
reied on RFOAs in seniority and rank. Id. at 241-42.
26. Id. at 233-38 (plurality opinion).
27. Id. at 243-44 (Scalia, J., concurring); see, e.g., EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,
191 F.3d 948, 950 (8th Cir. 1999) (noting the EEOC's opposition to an employer's reduc-
tion in force because of its adverse effect on older employees).
28. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 251-56 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. See U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) Charges, http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/adea.html (last visited Jan.
19, 2007) (reporting that the EEOC received 16,585 charges of age discrimination in FY
2005). Under the ADEA, an aggrieved individual must first file a complaint of age
discrimination with the EEOC. 29 U.S.C. § 626(d) (2000). After filing a charge with the
EEOC, the complainant must wait at least sixty days before filing a civil suit. Id.
30. E.g., Lumpkin v. Brown, 898 F. Supp. 1263, 1271-72 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (involving an
employer's noncompetitive career ladders for particular college graduates); see
LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 137. But see EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41
F.3d 1073, 1077-78 (7th Cir. 1994) (implying that the ADEA does not allow job applicants
to assert disparate impact claims because the text prohibits only those practices that ad-
versely affect "employees").
31. See Note, The Cost of Growing Old: Business Necessity and the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act, 88 YALE L.J. 565, 575-76 (1979) (remarking that employers con-
sider "overriding economic" concerns in a RIF); cf. Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas
Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2006) (noting that the employer's RIF was based on the
company's future needs and its intent to "select the 'best performers' to retain").
[Vol. 56:647
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tiffs also commonly assert disparate impact claims under the ADEA in
response to an employer's evaluations,32 terminations,33 or promotions.'
This Comment examines the nature and scope of ADEA disparate im-
pact recovery in light of Smith v. City of Jackson. Part I of this Comment
outlines the statutory basis for disparate impact recovery, focusing on the
legislative history and text of the ADEA. Part I also examines the cen-
tral issues within the ADEA disparate impact debate, and discusses how
the Supreme Court resolved each of these issues in City of Jackson. Part
II of this Comment analyzes the plurality and concurring opinions in City
of Jackson and asserts that the plurality opinion misinterpreted the
ADEA's text and legislative history, as well as the substantial differences
between the ADEA and Title VII. Finally, Part III of this Comment
proposes that Congress respond to City of Jackson by amending the
ADEA to preclude disparate impact recovery.
I. AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT ACT OF 1967
A. Legislative History of the ADEA
In 1964, Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act to prohibit
discrimination in employment based on race, color, sex, national origin,
and religion.35 During the debates on Title VII, Congressman John
Dowdy36 and Senator George Smathers37 introduced amendments to in-
32. See, e.g., Finch v. Hercules Inc., 865 F. Supp. 1104, 1128 (D. Del. 1994) (involving
an employer allegedly giving disproportionately lower rankings to its employees over the
age of fifty).
33. See, e.g., Evers v. Alliant Techsystems, Inc., 241 F.3d 948, 956 (8th Cir. 2001) (re-
jecting a discharged employee's disparate impact claim in part because of the employer's
cost justification).
34. See, e.g., Koger v. Reno, 98 F.3d 631,639-40 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (defendant employer
used scoring system that allegedly caused adverse impact on its older workers); Hiatt v.
Union Pac. R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1420 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir.
1995) (involving a challenge to the employer's mandatory promotions from brakeman to
conductor).
35. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). Title VII makes it unlawful to:
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment... [or] ... to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or appli-
cants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individ-
ual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Id. § 2000e-2(a).
36. See 110 CONG. REC. 2596 (1964). Congressman Dowdy referred to discrimination
affecting persons between forty and forty-five years of age, stating, "[this] is the worst kind
of discrimination when a person is discriminated against at that age, particularly, that
young age." Id. at 2596 (statement of Rep. Dowdy).
37. See id. at 9911-13. Senator Smathers echoed the sentiments of Congressman
Dowdy, asserting that "[w]hen we find that more and more people are not able to make a
2007]
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clude age as a protected status 8 However, Congress rejected the
amendments for lack of sufficient evidence of age discrimination in em-
ployment.39 As a result, Congress ordered Secretary of Labor W. Willard
Wirtz to research and report to Congress on the causes and effects of age
discrimination in employment.40
When submitted one year later, the Secretary's Report (Wirtz Re-
port) 4' became a driving force behind the enactment of federal legislation
prohibiting employment discrimination on account of age. Secretary
Wirtz reported that, in contrast to other forms of discrimination, employ-
ers did not demonstrate animus or intolerance of older workers.43 How-
ever, the Secretary discovered "substantial evidence of arbitrary ... dis-
crimination based on unsupported general assumptions about the effect
of age on ability." 44 Moreover, the Secretary commented that certain
"institutional arrangements," such as promotion-from-within programs
and pension plans, adversely affected older workers partly because of an
livelihood because of age, that is an actual and real kind of discrimination." Id. at 9912
(statement of Sen. Smathers).
38. Id. at 2596, 9911.
39. See 113 CONG. REC. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) (pointing to "the lack
of any concrete information and statistics to show the full magnitude of the problem"). In
addition, the opposition to the age amendments focused on the difficulty in defining age
discrimination. See, e.g., 110 CONG. REC. 2596 (1964) (statement of Rep. Celler) (arguing
that Congress would be "entering into a thicket of difficulties" if it adopted Congressman
Dowdy's amendment because it was unclear at what age persons began experiencing dis-
crimination).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-14 (1964), amended and superseded by Equal Employment
Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 10, 86 Stat. 103, 111.
41. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (1965) [hereinafter WIRTZ REPORT].
42. See Nathan E. Holmes, Comment, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967: Are Disparate Impact Claims Available?, 69 U. CIN. L. REv. 299, 305 (2000) (recog-
nizing the Wirtz Report's impact on subsequent federal age discrimination legislation).
43. WIRTz REPORT, supra note 41, at 5-6 (comparing the causes of age discrimination
and other forms of discrimination).
44. Id. at 5 (noting that this form of arbitrary discrimination occurred where employ-
ers set certain age ceilings for all their employees as a whole). Courts and commentators
argue that Secretary Wirtz's use of the term "arbitrary" signified intentional discrimina-
tion. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 254-56 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) (contending that arbitrary discrimination "clearly equates with disparate treatment");
Alfred W. Blumrosen, Interpreting the ADEA: Intent or Impact, in AGE DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENT ACT: A COMPLIANCE AND LITIGATION MANUAL FOR LAWYERS AND
PERSONNEL PRACTITIONERS 68, 74 (Monte B. Lake ed., 1982) (maintaining that the Wirtz
Report's distinction between arbitrary discrimination and adverse impact "permeates the
legislative history of the ADEA"). But see Steven J. Kaminshine, The Cost of Older
Workers, Disparate Impact, and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 42 FLA. L.
REv. 229, 290-92 (1990) (criticizing Blumrosen's correlation between "arbitrary" age dis-
crimination and disparate treatment).
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employer's interest in cost savings.45 In his recommendations to Con-
gress, the Secretary declared his support for federal legislation to curb
arbitrary age discrimination.4 In response to the institutional arrange-
ments where no arbitrary discrimination existed, however, the Secretary
did not advocate for federal legislation; instead, Secretary Wirtz encour-
aged employers to adopt new measures, including pension and seniority
arrangements. 47
After the Wirtz Report was issued, Congress began debating a pro-
posed bill prohibiting age discrimination in employment. 48 In accord with
Secretary Wirtz's findings, Congress recognized that misguided stereo-
types regarding age and ability fueled discrimination against older work-
ers.49 In addition, proponents of the legislation asserted that the ADEA
would become part of a comprehensive scheme to curb employment dis-
crimination.0 Finally, supporters contended that the legislation provided
45. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 15-16. On the promotion-from-within policies,
Secretary Wirtz noted that such policies, "accepted as desirable by management and
worker alike, very often restrict hiring from outside the firm to lower wage entry levels,
traditionally regarded as more suitable for younger workers." Id. at 15. On the issue of
pension plans, the Secretary commented, "[i]t is not clear to what extent these restraints
arise directly from cost factors." Id. at 16.
46. See id. at 22 (advocating for federal legislation that "declares, clearly and un-
equivocally, and implements so far as is practicable, a national policy with respect to hiring
on the basis of ability rather than age"). In his message to Congress supporting age dis-
crimination legislation, President Johnson reiterated the Wirtz Report's findings on "arbi-
trary" age discrimination:
Hundreds of thousands, not yet old, not yet voluntarily retired, find themselves
jobless because of arbitrary age discrimination....
In economic terms, this is a serious-and senseless-loss to a nation on the move.
But the greater loss is the cruel sacrifice in happiness and well-being which joblessness
imposes on these citizens and their families.
Special Message to the Congress Proposing Programs for Older Americans, 1 PUB.
PAPERS 32,37 (Jan. 23, 1967).
47. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 22.
4& See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 7. The Secretary's proposed age
discrimination legislation was a hybrid provision, borrowing its substantive prohibitions
from Title VII and its remedial provisions from the Fair Labor Standards Act. Id. at 7
n.24.
49. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 34,746 (1967) (statement of Rep. Olsen) (stating that
erroneous generalizations about older workers "have hardened into restrictive policies and
practices in the hiring of new employees"); id. at 34,745 (statement of Rep. Eilberg) (re-
marking that employers' stereotyped thinking resulted in discriminatory practices against
older workers); id. at 31,254 (statement of Sen. Javits) (asserting that much of the problem
with age discrimination in employment originated from sheer ignorance).
50. See id. at 34,744 (statement of Rep. Pucinski) (identifying Title VII's prohibition
of employment discrimination and commenting that "it is now time to legislate against one
of the cruelest forms of discrimination"); id. at 34,742 (statement of Rep. Burke) (referring
to Congress' enactment of Title VII and noting that justice required a similar response to
age discrimination).
2007]
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employers with flexibility in situations where age was closely related to
their business.5'
B. Text and Purpose of the ADEA
In 1967, Congress enacted the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
finding that it was "common practice" for employers to implement arbi-
trary age limits. 2 Furthermore, Congress emphasized that age discrimi-
53
nation in employment adversely affected interstate commerce. As en-
acted, the ADEA contains three explicit purposes: "to promote employ-
ment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and
workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the impact of age on
employment., 54 Under the ADEA, it is "unlawful for an employer.., to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual or otherwise discrimi-
nate against any individual ... because of such individual's age. 55 In
addition, the ADEA prohibits any employment practice that "limit[s],
segregate[s], or classif[ies] ... employees in any way which would... oth-
erwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such indi-
vidual's age.,56 After several amendments, the protections afforded by
the ADEA currently extend to all employees over forty years of age.57
51. See Age Discrimination in Employment: Hearings Before the General Subcomm.
on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 90th Cong. 39 (1967) (statement
of W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor) (asserting that under the proposed ADEA, the
employer defenses were "obviously broad"); 113 CONG. REc. 34,746 (1967) (statement of
Rep. Daniels) (asserting that the ADEA considered the interests of employers). But see
id. at 34,743 (statement of Rep. Mink) (criticizing the bona fide occupational qualification
(BFOQ) defense because employers could continue to advance erroneous stereotypes
concerning age and ability).
52. 29 U.S.C. § 621(a)(2) (2000).
53. Id. § 621(a)(4).
54. Id. § 621(b). Courts have held that the ADEA's purposes and legislative findings
mirror the Wirtz Report. See, e.g., Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581,
589 (2004). Similarly, in discussing the purposes of the ADEA and Title VII, the Supreme
Court has noted: "Congress designed the remedial measures in these statutes to serve as a
,spur or catalyst' to cause employers 'to self-examine and to self-evaluate their employ-
ment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far as possible, the last vestiges' of dis-
crimination." McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 358 (1995).
55. 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1).
56. Id. § 623(a)(2). The ADEA similarly regulates employment agencies, id. § 623(b),
and labor organizations, id. § 623(c).
57. Id. § 631(a). The ADEA originally contained an upper age limit of 65 years of
age. See H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 6 (1967), reprinted in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219. In
1978, Congress raised the upper age limit in the ADEA to 70 years of age with certain
exceptions, such as employees with unlimited tenure and policymaking executives. See
Age Discrimination in Employment Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-256, § 3, 92 Stat.
189, 189. In 1986, Congress removed the upper age limit entirely. Age Discrimination in
Employment Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-592, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 3342, 3342.
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The ADEA contains several exceptions for employers." First, an em-
ployer can adopt an otherwise prohibited employment practice "where
age is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the
normal operation of the particular business."59 In addition, an employer
is immune from ADEA liability where it uses an RFOA.6° As the EEOC
recognizes, however, these exceptions are difficult to define and are often
determined on a case-by-case basis.6'
C. Judicial Interpretations of Disparate Impact Recovery under the
ADEA
Courts have uniformly upheld a plaintiff's right to assert a disparate
treatment claim under the ADEA. 62 In addition, the Supreme Court has
5& See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (containing the BFOQ and RFOA exceptions). The
ADEA also contains defenses for bona fide seniority systems, id. § 623(f)(2)(A), employee
benefit plans, id. § 623(f)(2)(B), and employment decisions based on good cause, id. §
623(f)(3).
59. Id. § 623(f)(1). In Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, the Supreme Court set forth
a two-part analysis for the BFOQ defense. W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400,
413-14, 422-23 (1985). First, the employer must demonstrate that the challenged employ-
ment practice is "'reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the particular busi-
ness."' Id. at 413 (citation omitted). Second, the employer must demonstrate that it is
forced to use age as a factor in its employment practice, by showing either: "a substantial
basis for believing that all or nearly all employees above an age lack the qualifications
required for the position"; or that it would be "highly impractical" for the employer to
individually test employees for the particular qualifications. Id. at 422-23.
In raising the ADEA's upper age limit in 1978, the Senate remarked on the BFOQ
defense: "[T]here may be a factual basis for believing that substantially all employees
above a specified age would be unable to continue to perform safely and efficiently the
duties of their particular jobs ...." S. REP No. 95-493, at 10-11 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 504,513-14.
60. 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1). In EEOC v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court noted that Con-
gress drafted the RFOA provision "to insure that employers were permitted to use neutral
criteria not directly dependent on age." EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1983).
61. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.6-.7 (2006). With respect to the RFOA provision, EEOC
regulations caution that "[n]o precise and unequivocal determination can be made as to
[its] scope." Id. § 1625.7(b). The regulations make a similar finding as to the BFOQ de-
fense. Id. § 1625.6(a). These exceptions have influenced the ADEA disparate impact
debate because Title VII contains a BFOQ defense but not an RFOA provision. See
MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 517 (1988).
62 See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 352-53. In cases involving ADEA
disparate treatment claims, the courts have consistently adopted the three-part burden
shifting analysis used in Title VII cases. See, e.g., Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods Co., 143
F.3d 1042, 1047 (6th Cir. 1998); Woodman v. Haemonetics Corp., 51 F.3d 1087, 1091-92
(1st Cir. 1995). Under this three-part analysis:
The complainant in a Title VII trial must carry the initial burden under the statute
of establishing a prima facie case of racial discrimination....
The burden then must shift to the employer to articulate some legitimate, nondis-
criminatory reason for the employee's rejection....
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long held that Title VII authorizes disparate impact recovery.' However,
courts and commentators have long disagreed about the availability of
disparate impact recovery under the ADEA.64
1. Similarities Between Title VII and the ADEA
One of the central arguments in the disparate impact debate focuses on
the similarities between the substantive prohibitions of Title VII and the
ADEA.6' The Supreme Court first considered the similarities between
the two statutes in Lorillard v. Pons.66 In Lorillard, the plaintiff filed suit
against her former employer, alleging that her termination violated the
ADEA.67 The central issue in the case was whether the ADEA provided
a right to a jury trial in a private civil suit for lost wages. The Court held
in the affirmative, reasoning that the ADEA's remedial and procedural
provisions mirror the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), which provides
the right to trial by jury in similar suits.69 Although the Court ultimately
... [Then, the employee] must... be afforded a fair opportunity to show that peti-
tioner's stated reason for respondent's rejection was in fact pretext.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802,804 (1973).
63. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971). In Griggs, the Supreme
Court held that Title VII's goal of equal opportunity meant more than merely eradicating
intentional discrimination, and included removing institutional arrangements that ad-
versely affected persons based on race. Id. The Court reasoned that "good intent or ab-
sence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mecha-
nisms that operate as 'built-in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to meas-
uring job capability." Id.; see also Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 331 (1977) (allow-
ing for disparate impact recovery in gender-based discrimination claims under Title VII).
64. Compare Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting
from denial of certiorari) ("This Court has never held that proof of discriminatory impact
can establish a violation of the ADEA."), and Cassaundra L. Manning, Comment, Hazen
Paper Co. v. Biggins Revisited: The Supreme Court's Dismissal of Adams v. Florida Power
Corps., 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 767, 786 (2004) (commenting that Congress did not
intend to allow disparate impact recovery under the ADEA), with Palmer v. United States,
794 F.2d 534, 536 (9th Cir. 1986) (upholding the availability of disparate impact recovery
under the ADEA), and Jonas Saunders, Age Discrimination: Disparate Impact Under the
ADEA After Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins: Arguments in Favor, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV.
591, 610 (1996) (arguing that Title VII disparate impact liability should apply to ADEA).
65. See Douglas C. Herbert & Lani Schweiker Shelton, A Pragmatic Argument
Against Applying the Disparate Impact Doctrine in Age Discrimination Cases, 37 S. TEX. L.
REv. 625,632-34 (1996); Evan H. Pontz, Comment, What a Difference ADEA Makes: Why
Disparate Impact Theory Should Not Apply to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
74 N.C. L. REv. 267, 289 (1995) (acknowledging that, at first glance, the ADEA and Title
VII have strong similarities).
66. 434 U.S. 575,583-84 (1978).
67. Id. at 576.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 585.
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looked to the FLSA for guidance, the Court noted that the ADEA's sub-
stantive prohibitions "were derived in haec verba from Title VII.
70
Courts have often used Lorillard's reasoning in support of applying the
disparate impact model to the ADEA.7' In Geller v. Markham,7 for ex-
ample, a 55-year-old teacher alleged that her former employer's hiring
policies, which focused on recruiting teachers at lower salary levels, dis-
proportionately affected older workers.73 The Second Circuit applied the
Lorillard Court's finding regarding the similarities between Title VII and
the ADEA, and held that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact recov-
ery. 4 The court reasoned that "[a]lthough the ADEA did not adopt Title
VII's procedural rules entirely, the rule permitting a case to be estab-
lished by a showing of discriminatory impact or treatment cannot rea-
sonably be viewed as merely procedural.
75
On the other side of the disparate impact debate, some courts have rea-
soned that the ADEA and Title VII should not be interpreted in the
same manner in every situation, given the fundamental differences be-
tween the two statutes.76 In Mullin v. Raytheon Co.,77 for example, the
First Circuit held that the disparate impact model was not available under
the ADEA; in its decision, the court focused on three significant differ-
ences between Title VII and the ADEA.78 First, in contrast to Title VII,
the ADEA contains an RFOA provision, which, as the court recognized,
provides a layer of protection for employers against age discrimination
suits. 79 Second, the Wirtz Report explicitly stated that arbitrary assump-
tions, not invidious prejudice, engendered employers' discriminatory
70. Id. at 584; see also Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755-56 (1979) (look-
ing to Title VII provisions to determine whether an aggrieved employee must exhaust state
administrative remedies before filing an ADEA claim).
71. See, e.g., Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State Coll., 702 F.2d 686, 690-91 (8th Cir. 1983)
(applying Title VII case law to the admission of statistical evidence in an ADEA disparate
impact claim); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d Cir. 1980).
72. 635 F.2d 1027 (2d Cir. 1980).
73. Id. at 1029-30.
74. Id. at 1032.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1325-26 (11th Cir. 2001)
(pointing to the differences in the text and legislative histories of Title VII and the
ADEA); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701-04 (1st Cir. 1999).
77. 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir. 1999).
78. Id. at 701-04.
79. ld. at 701-02. Some commentators argue that courts should preclude disparate
impact recovery under the ADEA, similar to the Equal Pay Act (EPA), because both acts
contain exceptions allowing an employer to consider "other" factors. See Manning, supra
note 64, at 781-82. The EPA's exception, however, allows employers to institute a pay
differential based "on any other factor other than sex." 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1) (2000) (em-
phasis added); see also County of Wash. v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 169-70 (1981) (contrast-
ing the structure of the EPA with Title VII, and noting that Congress drafted the EPA's
"any other factor" exception to restrict plaintiffs to disparate treatment claims).
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policies toward older workers.8° Finally, the court noted that in the 1991
amendments to the Civil Rights Act, Congress widened the scope of Title
VII disparate impact liability and enlarged the burdens facing an em-
ployer in a Title VII suit, 8 without similarly amending the ADEA.s2
In City of Jackson, the Justices' opinions varied considerably regarding
the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA.83 A plurality of the
Court held that the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA support
the applicability of the disparate impact model to the ADEA.1 Justice
Stevens' plurality opinion reasoned, in part, that both statutes prohibit
actions that "otherwise adversely affect" an employee's status." Justice
Stevens argued that this clause explicitly focuses on the effects of an em-
ployment practice, rather than its motivation In addition, the plurality
noted that the language of the Wirtz Report mirrored the congressional
purposes of Title VII.87 These purposes had formed the basis for the Su-
preme Court's decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,88 which authorized
disparate impact recovery under Title VII.89 Similarly, a majority of the
Justices recognized Congress' failure to amend the ADEA on the issue of
disparate impact liability in 1991, but contended that the pre-1991 inter-
pretation of Title VII disparate impact liability could still apply to the
80. Mullin, 164 F.3d at 702-03.
81. Id. at 703. In 1991, Congress amended Title VII in response to Wards Cove Pack-
ing Co. v. Atonio, in which the Supreme Court had narrowed the scope of Title VII dispa-
rate impact liability. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005); Wards Cove
Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-60 (1989). In Wards Cove Packing, the
Court held that an employee must identify a specific employment practice alleged to be
discriminatory. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 657. Furthermore, the Court ruled that
after the Title VII plaintiff proves a prima facie case of disparate impact, only the burden
of production shifts to the employer; thus, the burden of persuasion would remain at all
times with the plaintiff. Id. at 659-60. Finally, the Wards Cove Packing Court rejected the
business necessity defense and ruled that the employer need only demonstrate that the
employment practice fulfilled, in any significant way, its legitimate business goals. Id. at
659-61. In response, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 altered the Title VII disparate impact
framework by placing the burden on the employer to defend a challenged employment
practice by demonstrating the practice is "job related for the position in question and con-
sistent with business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
82. Mullin, 164 F.3d at 703. But see Saunders, supra note 64, at 609 (noting that
"Congress has amended the ADEA but has not expressly prohibited" disparate impact
recovery).
83. Compare City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 233 (noting the "identical language" of Title
VII and the ADEA), with id. at 248 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to the "signifi-
cant differences" between the two statutes).
84. See id. at 233 (plurality opinion) (arguing that "it is appropriate to presume that
Congress intended [the] text to have the same meaning in both statutes").
85. Id. at 235.
86. Id. at 236.
87. Id. at 235 n.5.
88. 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
89. Id.
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ADEA because Congress had never explicitly precluded ADEA dispa-
rate impact recovery.90 Therefore, under the Court's view of an ADEA
disparate impact claim, a plaintiff must first point to a specific employ-
ment practice that adversely affects older workers; if the employer dem-
onstrates the use of a non-age factor, the plaintiff then carries the burden
of proving that the employer's justification is unreasonable. 9'
In concurrence, Justice O'Connor identified "significant textual differ-
ences" between the ADEA and Title VII. 92 For example, similar to the
First Circuit's opinion in Mullin, Justice O'Connor noted that the ADEA
contains an RFOA clause and seeks to remedy institutional arrangements
through noncoercive measures.93 In addition, Justice O'Connor disagreed
with the plurality's interpretation of the ADEA's "adversely affect"
clause.94 Justice O'Connor contended that the clause must be read in
conjunction with the requirement that age actually motivate an em-
ployer's decision.95  Accordingly, Justice O'Connor interpreted the
ADEA's prohibition to read that "[a]n employer may not, because of an
individual's age, limit, segregate, or classify his employees in a way that
harms that individual." '
2. Differences Between Age Discrimination and Other Forms of
Discrimination
A second part of the ADEA disparate impact debate involves a policy
question: given the mutability of age and the limited history of age dis-
97
crimination, is age a fundamentally different protected class than race or
sex?98 Courts have generally found that the two classes are entirely dif-
90. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240-41. On this issue, the plurality was joined by
Justice Scalia. See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring).
91. See id. at 241-43 (majority opinion); see also Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power
Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 143-44 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the burden-shifting analysis of City of
Jackson, and holding that the plaintiff employees had not discharged their burden of prov-
ing that the employer considered unreasonable factors in its RIF).
92. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 261 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
93. Id. In addition, Justice O'Connor rejected the application of Title VII disparate
impact liability to the ADEA because the Court's decision in Griggs occurred four years
after the ADEA's passage. Id. at 260. Accordingly, Justice O'Connor argued that "there
is no reason to suppose that Congress in 1967 could have foreseen the interpretation of
Title VII that was to come." Id.
94. Id. at 250.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 77 ("Barring unforeseen circum-
stances, every individual will become a member of the class protected by the ADEA."); see
also WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 6 (asserting that the aging process affects all per-
sons who live long enough).
98. See Mack A. Player, Wards Cove Packing or Not Wards Cove Packing? That is
Not the Question: Some Thoughts on Impact Analysis Under the Age Discrimination in
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ferent.99 For example, in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgiajn0
the Supreme Court held that rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny, is
the proper standard of review for age classifications.' In reaching its
decision, the Court reasoned that older persons "have not experienced a
'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or been subjected to unique
disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative
of their abilities."'12 r 103
Similarly, in Goldstein v. Manhattan Industries, Inc. , the Eleventh
Circuit discussed the mutability of age in the context of an ADEA dispa-
rate treatment claim. °4 There, a sixty-year-old sales representative ar-
gued that he was terminated from his position because of intentional age
discrimination.' 5 Although the court ultimately affirmed the jury's ver-
dict in favor of the plaintiff, 16 the court refused to automatically apgly the
burden-shifting approach of Title VII disparate treatment claims.' The
court reasoned that age discrimination is fundamentally different than
race or gender discrimination, in light of the mutability of age."
On the other side of the debate, some courts and commentators argue
that the ADEA and Title VII are part of an overall scheme to curb em-
ployment discrimination, and thus should be interpreted similarly.'09 In
Employment Act, 31 U. RICH. L. REV. 819, 829 (1997) (acknowledging that age is funda-
mentally different than the Title VII protected classes partly because age is a continuum).
99. See, e.g., Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (asserting that age
classifications, in contrast to racial or gender-based classifications, are not "'so seldom
relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in such
considerations are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy"' (quoting Cleburne v. Cle-
burne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985))); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S.
307, 312-14 (1976) (per curiam); Laugesen v. Anaconda Co., 510 F.2d 307, 313 n.4 (6th Cir.
1975) (refusing to apply Title VII's disparate treatment model automatically to an ADEA
claim partly because "[t]he progression of age is a universal human process"). But see
Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1165-66 (Cal. 1997) (comparing age discrimi-
nation to race and sex discrimination).
100. 427 U.S. 307 (1976) (per curiam).
101. Id. at 311-12.
102. Id. at 313; see also Hamilton v. Caterpillar Inc., 966 F.2d 1226, 1227 (7th Cir. 1992)
(disputing as "implausible" the argument that age discrimination is akin to race or sex
discrimination).
103. 758 F.2d 1435 (11th Cir. 1985).
104. Id. at 1442.
105. Id. at 1437-40.
106. Id. at 1446.
107. Id. at 1442-43.
108. Id. at 1442; see also Player, supra note 98, at 829 (recognizing that the mutability
of age is likely the strongest argument for opponents of ADEA disparate impact recov-
ery).
109. McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513 U.S. 352, 357 (1995); Oscar Mayer
& Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 756 (1979); Saunders, supra note 64, at 606-07 (arguing that
Congress demonstrated the same concerns in passing Title VII and the ADEA).
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McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publishing Co.,"° a discharged employee
filed suit against her former employer, alleging that her cost-based termi-
nation violated the ADEA." The employer argued it should not have to
provide any remedy for the unlawful termination because it learned, after
the discharge, that the employee had committed wrongdoing during her
employment.12  The Supreme Court ruled that evidence of employee
wrongdoing acquired after an employee's age-based termination does not
preclude the employee from recovery under the ADEA. 3 The Court
reasoned that the ADEA was "part of a wider statutory scheme to pro-
tect employees in the workplace nationwide.,
114
One court rejected the majority view concerning the mutability of age
and held that age is an immutable characteristic."5 In Stevenson v. Supe-
rior Court,"6 a discharged hospital employee alleged, inter alia, that her
termination violated the Fair Employment and Housing Act,"7 Califor-
nia's equivalent to the ADEA . Concluding that the plaintiff proved the
elements of a tortious wrongful discharge claim, the California Supreme
Court focused, in part, on the state's strong public policy against em-
ployment discrimination." 9 In reaching its decision, the court reasoned
that being over a certain age "is as permanent and immutable as race or
sex."' 20 Accordingly, the court found that age discrimination should not
be treated differently than other forms of discrimination.2
In City of Jackson, the Court's various opinions differed in their com-
parison of age discrimination and other forms of discrimination. '1 Justice
Stevens, writing for the plurality, contended that Congress must have
considered the ADEA and Title VII classes to be "sufficiently similar"
because the statutes contain identical language and were passed within
110. 513 U.S. 352 (1995).
111. Id. at 354.
112. See id. at 354-55.
113. See id. at 358 (noting that precluding the plaintiff from recovery would contradict
the ADEA's purpose of deterring discriminatory employment practices and compensating
the private litigants).
114. Id. at 357; see also Oscar Mayer, 441 U.S. at 756 (concluding that "the ADEA and
Title VII share a common purpose, the elimination of discrimination in the workplace").
115. See Stevenson v. Superior Court, 941 P.2d 1157, 1165 (Cal. 1997).
116. 941 P.2d 1157 (Cal. 1997).
117. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 12900-12996 (West 2005); Stevenson, 941 P.2d at 1158-59.
118. See Stevenson, 941 P.2d at 1158-59.
119. Id. at 1167.
120. Id. at 1165; see also Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 307 (asserting that gender, race,
and age are equally immutable characteristics).
121. See Stevenson, 941 P.2d at 1165-66.
122. Compare Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236-37 n.7 (2005) (plurality opin-
ion) (noting that the identical language in Title VII and the ADEA shows Congress' intent
to treat the classes similarly), with id. at 253 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (referring to
"qualitative[]" differences between age discrimination and other forms of discrimination).
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three years of each other.' A majority of the Justices, however, con-
ceded that ADEA disparate impact liability should be narrower than
Title VII partly because age, unlike Title VII's protected classes, is often
relevant to one's ability to engage in particular types of work. 24 In con-
currence, Justice O'Connor contended that age discrimination is funda-
mentally different from other forms of discrimination.ln2 Justice
O'Connor referred to the Wirtz Report's finding that erroneous assump-
tions, not intolerance, fueled discrimination against older workers. 26 Fur-
thermore, Justice O'Connor submitted that, in certain instances, there is
a connection between age and ability, in sharp contrast to the protected
classifications under Title VII.
127
3. Effect of Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins
Prior to City of Jackson, the Supreme Court's seminal opinion in
Hazen Paper Co. v. Bigginsl 8 significantly influenced the ADEA dispa-
rate impact debate. 29 In Hazen Paper, Walter Biggins filed a disparate
treatment claim under the ADEA, alleging that his employer terminated
him because of his age' 3° The First Circuit affirmed the jury's finding of
liability, ruling that the employer fired Biggins because his pension bene-
fits would have vested a few weeks later.13' The Supreme Court vacated
the judgment on the ADEA claim,32 finding that the plaintiff's age did
not motivate his termination.' The Court asserted that the drafters of
123. Id. at 233,236 n.7 (plurality opinion).
124. Id. at 240-41 (majority opinion).
125. Id. at 253-55 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
126. Id. at 254-55.
127. Id. at 255. Moreover, Justice O'Connor argued that because many employment
benefits increase with the employee's rise in seniority, an employer should not be held
liable solely because its cost-cutting measures have an adverse effect on older workers. Id.
at 259.
128. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
129. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 634 (positing that "[tihe era of unreflec-
tive transfer of the disparate impact doctrine from Title VII to the ADEA effectively
ended" with Hazen Paper); cf. Laurie A. McCann, Age Discrimination: Recent Trends, in
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 71, 71 (David L. Leitner ed., 1999) (criticiz-
ing the impact of Hazen Paper because the circuit courts relied on dictum from Justice
O'Connor's majority opinion).
130. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 606.
131. Id. at 607. The First Circuit argued that the jury could have found that Biggins'
age motivated the termination because his pension benefits would not have been so close
to vesting if not for his age. Id.
132. Id. at 617. Although there was no ADEA violation, the Court held that the plain-
tiff's termination violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). Id. at
612.
133. Id. at 609. In rejecting disparate treatment liability, the Court reasoned that the
employer did not terminate Biggins because of an inaccurate assumption about older
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the ADEA sought to prohibit employment discrimination based on erro-
neous or stereotypical assumptions about older workers; however, where
an employer relies on a non-age factor, these assumptions do not exist.'
34
In dictum, the Court noted that "[d]isparate treatment.., captures the
essence of what Congress sought to prohibit in the ADEA. '' 135 Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Thomas, echoed the majority's concerns regarding the availability of dis-
parate impact recovery under the ADEA6 The concurring opinion as-
serted that "there are substantial arguments that it is improper to carry
over disparate impact analysis from Title VII to the ADEA.', 137
Hazen Paper had a resounding effect on the judicial interpretations of
ADEA disparate impact recovery.' 38 In Gantt v. Wilson Sporting Goods
Co.,"' a discharged employee filed suit under the ADEA alleging that her
former employer's leave of absence policy adversely affected older work-
ers.' 4 The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the plaintiff's
ADEA disparate impact claim, rejecting an earlier Sixth Circuit opinion
in which the court appeared to favor disparate impact recovery under the
ADEA.14 ' The Gantt court reasoned that the ADEA disparate impact
model was now in "'considerable doubt"' in light of Hazen Paper.'42
Similarly, several other circuits rejected disparate impact recovery under
the ADEA after Hazen Paper.
143
workers. Id. at 611-12. Rather, the termination was an accurate determination that the
employee's pension benefits were close to vesting. Id. at 612.
134. Id. at 610-11. The Court reasoned that the most common form of age discrimina-
tion occurs when "an older employee [is] fired because the employer believes that produc-
tivity and competence decline with old age." Id. at 610.
135. Id. at 610; see also W. Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 422 (1985) (recog-
nizing that the ADEA requires employers to evaluate its older employees based on merit,
rather than age).
136. Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 618 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
137. Id.
138. See Holmes, supra note 42, at 311 (referring to the post-Hazen Paper circuit split
on ADEA disparate impact recovery); Player, supra note 98, at 825 (arguing that several
courts "ignored the Court's reservation" and used the Hazen Paper language to overrule
their own precedent, which had favored ADEA disparate impact recovery).
139. 143 F.3d 1042 (6th Cir. 1998).
140. Id. at 1044-45.
141. See id. at 1048.
142. Id. (quoting Lyon v. Ohio Education & Professional Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 139
n.5 (6th Cir. 1995)).
143. See, e.g., Adams v. Fla. Power Corp., 255 F.3d 1322, 1326 (11th Cir. 2001) (reason-
ing that although Hazen Paper did not explicitly preclude ADEA disparate impact liabil-
ity, its language suggests such a result); O'Regan v. Arbitration Forums, Inc., 246 F.3d 975,
986 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding that the ADEA does not authorize disparate impact recov-
ery); Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 700 (1st Cir. 1999) (asserting that "tectonic
plates shifted" after Hazen Paper); Ellis v. United Airlines, Inc., 73 F.3d 999, 1007-10 (10th
Cir. 1996) (rejecting ADEA disparate impact recovery in part because of Hazen Paper's
dictum and the subsequent circuit split); DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d
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In contrast, the Eighth Circuit in Smith v. City of Des Moines T4 re-
mained consistent with its prior rulings, and held that the ADEA author-
izes disparate impact recovery.14 1 In City of Des Moines, a discharged fire
captain alleged that his former employer's testing standards dispropor-
tionately affected older employees 46 In moving for summary judgment,
the city argued, in part, that the ADEA did not authorize disparate im-
pact claims. 47 Dismissing the city's argument, the court reasoned that
Hazen Paper did not provide a "'clear indication' to overrule Eighth
Circuit precedent. 48 Likewise, other courts held that Hazen Paper's dic-
tum did not provide a sufficient basis for overruling their precedent.'49
In City of Jackson, the majority announced that its decision in Hazen
Paper did not affect the interpretation of ADEA disparate impact recov-
ery. Following the City of Des Moines reasoning, the Court recognized
that Hazen Paper was merely a disparate treatment case . 51 Furthermore,
the Court relied upon its explicit statement in Hazen Paper that it would
not determine whether the ADEA authorized disparate impact recov-
ery.12 In concurrence, Justice O'Connor interpreted Hazen Paper in a
slightly different fashion, arguing that the Court had "never read the
[ADEA] to impose liability upon an employer without proof of discrimi-
natory intent. ,'13 Thus, Justice O'Connor argued that the majority ig-
nored Hazen Paper's guidance by authorizing disparate impact recovery
under the ADEA.'54
719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting that the Court's comments in Hazen Paper "cast[] consider-
able doubt" on ADEA disparate impact recovery).
144. 99 F.3d 1466 (8th Cir. 1996).
145. Id. at 1470.
146. Id. at 1467-68.
147. Id. at 1469.
148. Id. at 1470 (quoting FDIC v. Bowles Livestock Comm'n Co., 937 F.2d 1350, 1354
(8th Cir. 1991)). Although ruling that the ADEA authorizes disparate impact recovery,
the City of Des Moines court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the defendant
employer because the employer met its burden of proving that its employment policy satis-
fied business necessity. Id. at 1470-71; see also infra Part I.C.5. (outlining the business
necessity defense to disparate impact claims).
149. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 856-57 (9th Cir. 2000) (re-
versing the district court's holding that Hazen Paper precluded ADEA disparate impact
recovery); Dist. Council 37, AFSCME v. N.Y. City Dep't of Parks & Recreation, 113 F.3d
347, 351 (2d Cir. 1997) (allowing the plaintiff to pursue a disparate impact claim because
Hazen Paper did not explicitly reject such recovery).
150. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 237-38 (2005).
151. See id. at 237.
152. See id. at 238.
153. Id. at 248 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
154. Id. at 247-48.
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4. The Purpose of the ADEA's RFOA Provision
Another element of the disparate impact debate is whether the
ADEA's RFOA provision serves as a defense for employers or a "safe
harbor" precluding disparate impact claims entirely.5 1 In support of the
safe harbor argument, many courts and commentators 156 point to Judge
Easterbrook's dissent in Metz v. Transit Mix, Inc.'5 7 In Metz, a fifty-four-
year-old company manager brought suit against his former employer,
alleging that his termination was an act of intentional age discrimina-
tion.55 Applying the disparate treatment model of recovery, the court
rejected the employer's cost savings justification, and the court noted that
where age and salary are closely correlated, "it would undermine the
goals of the ADEA to recognize cost-cutting as a nondiscriminatory justi-
fication for an employment decision."' 9 In dissent, Judge Easterbrook
analyzed the case from the disparate impact model of proof because the
plaintiff failed to demonstrate the requisite elements of intent and causa-
tion. 60 Judge Easterbrook rejected the majority's holding that an em-
ployer's cost justification failed to constitute a legitimate, nondiscrimina-
tory reason for an employee's discharge. 16 Moreover, Judge Easterbrook
argued that the RFOA provision
impl[ies] strongly that the employer may use a ground of decision
that is not age, even if it varies with age.... Surely [the provision]
does not mean simply that "only age discrimination is age dis-
crimination." "The prohibition and the exception appear identi-
cal. The sentence is incomprehensible unless the prohibition for-
bids disparate treatment and the exception authorizes disparate
impact."' 62
155. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 639 (commenting that most opposition to
ADEA disparate impact recovery focuses on the RFOA provision); see also 1 HOWARD C.
EGLIT, AGE DISCRIMINATION § 5.14 (2d ed. 2005) (recognizing that some circuits have
interpreted the RFOA as an affirmative defense).
156. See, e.g., Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 618 (1993) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (citing Judge Easterbrook as the author of one of the "substantial arguments" in
opposition to ADEA disparate impact recovery); Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980,
987 (10th Cir. 1996) (rejecting the plaintiff's adverse impact claim under the ADEA be-
cause the statute explicitly allows an employer to use an RFOA); Peter H. Harris, Note,
Age Discrimination, Wages, and Economics: What Judicial Standard?, 13 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 715, 730 (1990) (commenting that the RFOA exception rejects most, if not all,
disparate impact claims).
157. 828 F.2d 1202, 1211 (7th Cir. 1987) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
158. Id. at 1203 (majority opinion).
159. Id. at 1207.
160. Id. at 1214-16 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
161. Id. at 1212.
162. Id. at 1220 (quoting Douglas Laycock, Continuing Violations, Disparate Impact in
Compensation, and Other Title VII Issues, 49 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 55 (1986)).
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In the Fifth Circuit's decision in City of Jackson, the court adopted a
similar "safe harbor" reasoning in its interpretation of the RFOA provi-
sion.16 Moreover, the court argued that post-Hazen Paper case law sup-
ported interpreting the provision as intending to prohibit only intentional
age discrimination.64
On the other side of the debate, some courts and commentators argue
that the RFOA provision provides employers with a defense to a dispa-
rate impact charge under the ADEA, rather than a safe harbor from li-
ability. For example, in Hiatt v. Union Pacific Railroad,'6 6 former rail-
road employees alleged that their employer's mandatory promotions ad-
versely affected older workers. 167 The United States District Court for
the District of Wyoming granted the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, finding that Title VII disparate im pact theory could not be
automatically applied to the ADEA context.' The court reasoned, in
large part, that the statutes had different substantive provisions and pur-
poses. 169 In dictum, however, the Hiatt court rejected the employer's ar-
gument that the RFOA clause served as an independent bar to disparate
impact recovery under the ADEA.170 The court asserted that the clause
could coexist with the disparate impact model by codifying the business
necessity defense and thus allowing employers to consider reasonable,
non-age factors. 7'
163. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 351 F.3d 183, 189-91 (5th Cir. 2003), affd, 544 U.S.
228 (2005).
164. Id. at 190; see, e.g., Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696, 701-02 (1st Cir. 1999)
(echoing Judge Easterbrook's Metz dissent by noting that "if the [RFOA] exception... is
not understood to preclude disparate impact liability, it becomes nothing more than a
bromide to the effect that 'only age discrimination is age discrimination"').
165. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 122 (1985) (refer-
ring, in dictum, to the RFOA provision as an affirmative defense); Hiatt v. Union Pac.
R.R., 859 F. Supp. 1416, 1434 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995); Player,
supra note 98, at 832 (submitting that the RFOA provision is a defense because its text and
structure presumes that an employer has committed an "otherwise prohibited" act). Even
in those jurisdictions that recognized the RFOA provision as a defense prior to City of
Jackson, there was a debate as to the allocation of the burdens of production and persua-
sion. 1 EGLIT, supra note 155, § 5.15 (recognizing the circuit split on whether the RFOA
clause is an affirmative defense requiring the employer to bear the burdens of production
and persuasion on its justification for its employment practice); see also Smith v. City of
Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1470-71 (8th Cir. 1996) (placing the burden of persuasion on the
employer to prove that its physical fitness test was related to the position, but noting that it
was unclear whether this burden allocation survived the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
166. 859 F. Supp. 1416 (D. Wyo. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 838 (10th Cir. 1995).
167. Id. at 1420.
168. Id. at 1434.
169. Id. at 1434-37.
170. Id. at 1434.
171. Id.; see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1080 (7th Cir. 1994)
(Cudahy, J., dissenting) (submitting that the RFOA exception codifies the business neces-
sity defense); Caron v. Scott Paper Co., 834 F. Supp. 33, 37 n.4 (D. Me. 1993) (arguing that
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In City of Jackson, the plurality opinion disagreed with the Fifth Cir-
cuit's categorical rejection of ADEA disparate impact liability.1 2 Instead,
the plurality argued that the RFOA provision serves its central role in
disparate impact claims.'73 The plurality opinion reasoned that under
disparate treatment theory, if an employer uses a non-age factor, there
would likely be no violation of the ADEA, regardless of the existence of
an RFOA provision./4 In contrast, under disparate impact theory, the
RFOA provision precludes liability only if "the adverse impact was at-
tributable to a nonage factor that was 'reasonable."",17' The plurality fur-
ther noted that Congress could have excluded disparate impact recovery
entirely by dropping the modifier "reasonable" and instead adopting a
broader exception, such as the Equal Pay Act (EPA)'s "any other factor"
exception.
In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor argued that the plurality's expan-
sive reading of the ADEA misinterpreted the purpose and effect of the
RFOA provision.177 After submitting that the ADEA prohibitions ex-
tend only to intentional discrimination,178 Justice O'Connor asserted that
the RFOA clause allows an employer to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie
case of intentional age discrimination.'7 9 Moreover, Justice O'Connor
observed that the RFOA provision serves a separate function when the
employer had multiple motives for its action.180 Justice O'Connor recog-
nized that in these cases, the provision would validate an employment
practice based on a reasonable, non-age factor, even if age played a "sub-
181
stantial part" in the practice.
Congress included the RFOA exception as a defense so that the ADEA would apply only
to unreasonable policies), abrogated by Mullin v. Raytheon Co., 164 F.3d 696 (1st Cir.
1999).
172. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238-40 (2005) (plurality opinion) (re-
jecting the safe harbor argument, and asserting that the ADEA's legislative history and
text support disparate impact liability notwithstanding the RFOA provision).
173. Id. at 239.
174. See id. at 238-39.
175. Id. at 239 (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 239 n.11.
177. Id. at 251-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
178. Id. at 249-51.
179. Id. at 252. Justice O'Connor compared the RFOA provision to the "legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason" defense provided in Title VII. Id.; see also Krieg v. Paul Re-
vere Life Ins. Co., 718 F.2d 998, 999 (11th Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (viewing the RFOA
provision as a means to rebut plaintiff's prima facie case of intentional age discrimination);
Marshall v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 576 F.2d 588, 590-92 (5th Cir. 1978) (submitting that
some of the factors that may be used by the defendant to rebut the plaintiff's case serve to
deny plaintiff's prima facie case of disparate treatment).
180. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 253 (O'Connor, J. concurring). In mixed-motive
cases, both legitimate and illegitimate motives fuel the employer's action. See Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228,241 (1989).
181. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 253 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
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5. Employer's Defense Under the ADEA
In those jurisdictions that authorized disparate impact recovery prior to
City of Jackson, nearly all courts found that the ADEA, similarly to Title
VII, required the employer to prove that its particular employment prac-
tice satisfied a business necessity defense.'8 Under this approach, the
employer must demonstrate that its policy "is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity."' 83 Moreover, even
after the employer meets its burden of demonstrating job relatedness, the
plaintiff can still prevail by proving that other employment practices
would have served the employer's legitimate business interests without
the same discriminatory effect.'8
In Leftwich v. Harris-Stowe State College,' for example, a college pro-
fessor alleged that his employer's policy of setting aside a specific number
of faculty slots for untenured faculty adversely affected older workers.
' 86
After the plaintiff established his prima facie case of disparate impact, the
court required the college to justify its policy based on business neces-
sity.'g The Eighth Circuit rejected the college's cost-savings' g, and "inno-
182. See LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 682; see also Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co.,
318 F.3d 1066, 1076 (11th Cir. 2003) (requiring the employer to demonstrate business ne-
cessity); Finnegan v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (7th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting plaintiff's prima facie case of age discrimination because market forces necessi-
tated the employer's limitations on vacation rights). Prior to City of Jackson, Lindemann
and Kadue noted that only one court-the United States District Court for the Central
District of California-adopted the RFOA standard instead of the business necessity de-
fense. LINDEMANN & KADUE, supra note 7, at 682 & n.71. In EEOC v. Newport Mesa
Unified School District, the court rejected the EEOC's claim that the RFOA provision
incorporated the business necessity defense. EEOC v. Newport Mesa Unified Sch. Dist.,
893 F. Supp. 927, 932 (C.D. Cal. 1995). Instead, the court held that the RFOA provision
demonstrates Congress' intent to provide "more leeway" to employers in considering age.
Id.
Notwithstanding Newport Mesa, EEOC regulations continue to support the business
necessity defense under the ADEA. See 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(d) (2006). But see Player,
supra note 98, at 841 (rejecting the application of the business necessity defense to the
ADEA and arguing that the RFOA provision requires business "rationality," rather than
necessity).
183. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000).
184. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (Title VII case);
Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1473 (8th Cit. 1996) (applying the Title VII
disparate impact analysis to an ADEA claim); Geller v. Markham, 635 F.2d 1027, 1032 (2d
Cir. 1980) (same).
185. 702 F.2d 686 (8th Cir. 1983).
186. Id. at 689-90.
187. Id. at 691; see also Steger, 318 F.3d at 1076 (finding that economic necessity and
other objective factors justified the plaintiff's layoff).
188. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 691. But see James v. N.Y. Racing Ass'n, 233 F.3d 149, 153
(2d Cir. 2000) (finding that an employer's concern with the high costs of employing older
workers did not violate the ADEA); Anderson v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 13 F.3d 1120,
1125-26 (7th Cir. 1994) (rejecting the plaintiff's ADEA claim in light of the employer's cost
justification). EEOC regulations provide that, with a limited exception, an employer can-
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,, 189 . .vation justifications, noting in part that the burden of proving business
necessity is a "heavy one."'19 The court ruled that an employer must
show that its policy has a clear relationship to the position and that there
is a "compelling need" for the policy.191
In City of Jackson, the Supreme Court adopted a different rationale
and held that the ADEA requires only the use of an RFOA, rather than
the higher standard of business necessity.'9 The Court noted that the
scope of ADEA disparate impact liability is narrower than Title VII be-
cause of two substantive differences between the statutes.9 First, the
Court argued that the ADEA's RFOA provision limited disparate impact
liability by allowing an employer to consider reasonable, non-age factors
in adopting employment practices. 94 Second, the Court observed that
Congress widened the scope of Title VII disparate impact liability in 1991
without similarly amending the ADEA.' 95 In sum, the Court announced:
Congress' decision to limit the . . .ADEA by including the
RFOA provision is consistent with the fact that age, unlike race
or other classifications protected by Title VII, not uncommonly
has relevance to an individual's capacity to engage in certain
types of employment .... Thus, it is not surprising that certain
employment criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable
despite their adverse impact on older workers as a group.196
not base an older employee's termination on a cost-savings interest. 29 C.F.R. § 1625.7(f)
(2006) ("A differentiation based on the average cost of employing older employees as a
group is unlawful except with respect to employee benefit plans ... ").
In contrast, courts have consistently rejected an employer's cost-savings defense in Title
VII cases. See, e.g., L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1978)
(rejecting employer's cost defense to a sex discrimination claim, as "neither Congress nor
the courts have recognized such a defense under Title VII"); EEOC v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co.,
256 F.3d 516, 523-24 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting, in a Title VII claim, an employer's asserted
interest in cost savings).
189. Leftwich, 702 F.2d at 692.
190. Id.
191. Id. (emphasis omitted).
192. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240-41, 243 (2005). Justice Scalia joined
this part of Justice Stevens' opinion, thus giving the Court a majority on its ruling regard-
ing the RFOA defense. See id. at 243 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also ANDREW J.
RUZICHO & Louis A. JACOBS, LITIGATING AGE DISCRIMINATION CASES § 2:8, at 64
(Supp. 2006) ("ADEA precedent imposing a business necessity defense on employers is no
longer viable.").
193. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240; see infra notes 193-96 and accompanying text. In
concurrence, Justice O'Connor conceded that, if disparate impact claims are allowed under
the ADEA, they should be strictly limited by the RFOA provision. City of Jackson, 544
U.S. at 267 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Under Justice O'Connor's view, if an employer
produces evidence demonstrating it used an RFOA, the plaintiff "bears the burden of
disproving this assertion." Id.
194. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 240-41.
195. Id. at 240; see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
196. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 24041.
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Accordingly, the Court found that ADEA disparate impact liability could
be analyzed under the pre-1991 standard applicable to Title VII disparate
impact claims.' 97
After announcing the RFOA defense, the Court analyzed whether the
city met its burden of demonstrating the use of reasonable, non-age fac-
tors.t9n The Court accepted the city's reliance on seniority and rank be-
cause of the city's asserted purpose to increase employees' salaries to the
regional average.199 Furthermore, under the reasonableness test, the
Court did not consider whether there were alternative ways for the em-
ployer to achieve its goals without causing a disparate impact on older
workers.m As the Court noted, the analysis under an ADEA disparate
impact claim, in contrast to Title VII, examines only whether the particu-
lar non-age factor used by the employer is reasonable.201
II. EXAMINING SMITH V. CITY OF JACKSON: How THE SUPREME COURT
IGNORED THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY AND TEXT OF THE ADEA
A. The City of Jackson Plurality Opinion Ignored the Legislative Intent
and Plain Meaning of the ADEA
The ADEA's legislative history firmly rejects the City of Jackson plu-
rality's contention that Congress intended the ADEA to authorize dispa-
rate impact liability.m First, the Wirtz Report drew a clear distinction
197. Id. at 240; supra note 91 and accompanying text; see also Sarah Benjes, Comment,
Smith v. City of Jackson: A Pretext of Victory for Employees, 83 DENV. U. L. REv. 231,
250-51 (2005) (noting that the Wards Cove Packing allocation of the burdens of proof and
persuasion now apply to the ADEA).
198. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 241-42.
199. Id. at 242.
200. Id. at 243.
201. See id. Since City of Jackson, courts have commented on the employer's defense
to an ADEA charge. See, e.g., Meacham v. Knolls Atomic Power Lab., 461 F.3d 134, 143
(2d Cir. 2006) (finding that the employer had put forth a legitimate business justification
for its RIF, as it sought to "reduce its workforce while still retaining employees with skills
critical to the performance of [the company's] functions" (quotation omitted)); Pippin v.
Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1201 (10th Cir. 2006) (finding that even if
the plaintiff had proven a prima facie case of disparate impact, the employer still would
have been entitled to summary judgment because its RIF relied on reasonable, non-age
factors -"prior job performance and skill set"); Durante v. Qualcomm, Inc., 144 F. App'x
603, 607 (9th Cir. 2005) (affirming the dismissal of the plaintiffs disparate impact claim
because the employer considered reasonable, diverse business factors in the company's
RIF).
202. See Pamela S. Krop, Note, Age Discrimination and the Disparate Impact Doctrine,
34 STAN. L. REv. 837, 853 n.75 (1982) (arguing that the ADEA's legislative history is "re-
plete" with references to Congress' intent to prohibit only arbitrary age discrimination);
Manning, supra note 64, at 786-87 (contending that the ADEA's legislative history demon-
strates Congress' intent to prohibit only disparate treatment); cf. Brendan Sweeney,
"Downsizing" the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: The Availability of Disparate
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between arbitrary age discrimination and neutral practices with an ad-
verse impact. While recommending the implementation of federal leg-
islation to eliminate arbitrary - or intentional - acts of age discrimination,
Secretary Wirtz explicitly pushed for informal responses to remedy the
problem of institutional arrangements causing an adverse impact on older
workers.204 During the legislative debates on the ADEA, supporters of
the ADEA furthered this pivotal distinction by consistently asserting
their intent to prohibit employment discrimination based on erroneous
• • 205
assumptions regarding older workers. In response to the institutional
arrangements, Congress followed Secretary Wirtz's recommendations
and rejected making such programs illegal.2° However, the City of Jack-
son plurality erred in according no weight to this explicit distinction in
the ADEA's legislative history.0 7 Contrary to unambiguous legislative
intent, the plurality focused on the effects of an employer's action rather
than the motivation.
Similarly, the City of Jackson plurality opinion misinterpreted the plain
meaning of the ADEA's text.2°9 By focusing on the ADEA's prohibition
Impact Liability, 41 VILL. L. REv. 1527, 1542 (1996) (asserting that the ADEA's legislative
history does not offer a clear answer on whether Congress intended to authorize disparate
impact liability).
203. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 21-22 (outlining the Secretary's recommen-
dations for eliminating arbitrary age discrimination and responding to institutional ar-
rangements); see also Blumrosen, supra note 44, at 74 (recognizing the Wirtz Report's
obvious distinction between arbitrary discrimination and adverse impact). But see Michael
C. Sloan, Comment, Disparate Impact in the Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Will
the Supreme Court Permit It?, 1995 Wis. L. REv. 507, 518-19 (1995) (disputing Blumrosen's
conclusion because the Wirtz Report's findings mirror the congressional purposes recog-
nized in Griggs).
204. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 22 ("It will be necessary to modify some
existing arrangements, to encourage new kinds of employer and union actions, and to
explore additional steps to be taken by the Federal Government."). In particular, Secre-
tary Wirtz noted the importance of providing training and counseling to older workers and
employers. Id. at 23.
205. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REC. 34,744 (1967) (statement of Rep. Pucinski) (noting that
the proposed ADEA would limit the use of arbitrary employment practices and proce-
dures); id. at 31,253 (statement of Sen. Yarborough) (recognizing the dual goals of the
ADEA to curb invidious age classifications and "educate" employers about older workers'
abilities).
206. See Blumrosen, supra note 44, at 79 (analyzing the ADEA's legislative history and
determining that the drafters did not intend to prohibit group-based impacts).
207. See id. at 74 (concluding that the ADEA's legislative history demonstrates a clear
distinction between intentional discrimination and policies with an adverse impact). See
generally Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233-40 (2005).
208. See Blumrosen, supra note 44, at 91-93 (concluding that Congress intended the
ADEA to prohibit only those employment practices motivated solely by age). See gener-
ally City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 236.
209. See Joel S. Allen et al., Split Decisions: The Lack of Consensus on Disparate Im-
pact Claims Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV.
63, 74-75 (2004) (analyzing the ADEA's text and concluding that "[o]ne does not refer to
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of employment practices that "adversely affect" older workers, the plu-
rality disregarded the Act's subsequent clause: the particular employment
practice must be adopted "because of such individual's age., 210 Because
the latter clause is set off by a comma, its most logical meaning is that an
employer violates the ADEA only if age motivates the employer's deci-
sion and the practice adversely affects older employees.'" Of further
significance, the "adversely affect" clause only pertains to employees, not
applicants. Because applicants are the most common group of plaintiffs
to assert disparate impact claims, it is unlikely that Congress would ex-
tend this form of recovery to the ADEA without applying it to the most
likely beneficiaries.
B. Lorillard and the ADEA's Text Reject the Plurality's Reasoning on the
Similarities Between Title VII and the ADEA
In City of Jackson, the plurality pointed to Lorillard's holding regard-
ing the identical substantive prohibitions in Title VII and the ADEA.1
However, there are several problems with applying Lorillard to the
the results or effects of an action when stating that something happened 'because of' that
particular action"); Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 633-37 (examining whether the
ADEA's text is logically inconsistent with disparate impact theory).
210. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 291-92, 292 n.154 (contending that the ADEA's text
prohibits only those employment practices motivated by age). But see Kaminshine, supra
note 44, at 299 & n.347 (arguing that the ADEA's "adversely affect" clause unambiguously
supports the availability of disparate impact recovery).
211. See Krop, supra note 202, at 843 & n.27 (arguing that the "because of... age"
clause modifies the prohibited conduct and thus requires the two provisions to be inter-
preted together); Sweeney, supra note- 202, at 1543; see also DiBiase v. SmithKline
Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d 719, 733-34 (3d Cir. 1995) (relying explicitly upon Krop's analysis
to reject the application of disparate impact recovery under the ADEA). But see Marla
Ziegler, Note, Disparate Impact Analysis and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act,
68 MINN. L. REV. 1038, 1051-52 (1984) (contending that plaintiffs should be able to re-
cover based on disparate impact under the ADEA because the text explicitly prohibits
employment practices that "adversely affect" older workers).
212. See Krop, supra note 202, at 843. Compare 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2000) (prohibit-
ing employment practices in regard to employees and applicants), with id. § 623(a)(2)
(applying prohibitions only to employees). In contrast, Title VII's parallel provision per-
tains to applicants for employment. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(2) (2000); Pontz, supra
note 65, at 292 n.156 (arguing that the omission of job applicants from one of the ADEA's
substantive prohibitions is significant because Title VII's provision applies to job appli-
cants); supra note 35.
213. See Krop, supra note 202, at 843 (noting that job applicants most commonly assert
disparate impact claims, and thus questioning whether Congress would allow for disparate
impact recovery but exclude applicants).
214. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 233-34 (2005) (plurality opinion). The City
of Jackson plurality also cited Oscar Mayer, where the Court compared similar substantive
provisions of Title VII and the ADEA. See id. at 234 n.4; Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans,
441 U.S. 750,755-56 (1979).
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ADEA disparate impact debate.2 '5 First, the Lorillard holding does not
support the assertion that Title VII and the ADEA should always be in-
terpreted in haec verba because the Lorillard Court itself looked to the
Fair Labor Standards Act for guidance in reaching its opinion.1 6 Second,
the Lorillard Court compared substantive provisions of Title VII and the
ADEA.217 In sharp contrast, there is no textual basis for Title VII's dis-
parate impact model -the Court, not Congress, created the doctrine in its
subsequent opinion in Griggs.21' Third, Congress could not have intended
to apply the disparate impact model to the ADEA because Congress
enacted the ADEA four years before Griggs was decided.219
In reaching its opinion in City of Jackson, the plurality also overlooked
a key textual difference between Title VII and the ADEA: the ADEA'sS• 221
RFOA provision.220 Despite acknowledging this provision, the plurality
maintained that it could still apply Title VII disparate impact analysis to
the ADEA because the statutes had similar language and were enacted
within three years of each other" 2 As a result of rejecting the impor-
215. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 633-34 (contending that Lorillard coun-
sels against an automatic application of Title VII principles to the ADEA); Krop, supra
note 202, at 841 (criticizing the application of Lorillard to ADEA disparate impact recov-
ery). But see Jan W. Henkel, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act: Disparate Im-
pact Analysis and the Availability of Liquidated Damages After Hazen Paper Co. v. Big-
gins, 47 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1183, 1197 (1997) (arguing that courts will likely continue to
apply Lorillard to authorize ADEA disparate impact recovery because Congress has not
rejected its consistent application by lower courts).
216. See Krop, supra note 202, at 841 (asserting that the Court's holding in Lorillard-a
plaintiff has a right to a jury trial under the ADEA-was contrary to Title VII, which at
the time did not allow for a jury trial); Pontz, supra note 65, at 290 (contending that Loril-
lard contradicts an automatic application of Title VII rules to the ADEA context).
217. See Krop, supra note 202, at 842.
218. See Manning, supra note 64, at 772 & n.45 (noting that Title VII disparate impact
liability was "judicially determined").
219. See Allen et al., supra note 209, at 80; Saunders, supra note 64, at 606-07 (ac-
knowledging that Congress could not have foreseen the holding in Griggs when it debated
the ADEA, but asserting that the principles underlying Griggs mirror the ADEA's pur-
poses).
220. See Holmes, supra note 42, at 306 (acknowledging the strong similarities between
Title VII and the ADEA but arguing that the latter's RFOA provision demonstrates that
the Title VII disparate impact model of proof is inapplicable to the ADEA context);
Pontz, supra note 65, at 293 (referring to the RFOA provision as "[t]he defense most obvi-
ously inconsistent with disparate impact theory"). But see Marino, supra note 12, at 667
(contending that the RFOA provision should be interpreted as a codification of the busi-
ness necessity defense).
221. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 238-40 (2005) (plurality opinion) (holding
that the RFOA provision limits, but does not preclude, ADEA disparate impact liability).
222. Id. at 233-34 (noting the similarities in substantive prohibitions and arguing that
Griggs served as compelling precedent). But see Howard Eglit, The Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, Title VII, and the Civil Rights Act of 1991: Three Acts and a Dog That
Didn't Bark, 39 WAYNE L. REV. 1093, 1101 n.36 (1993) (commenting that although the
ADEA and Title VII are "statutory relatives ... [that] does not make them twins").
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tance of the RFOA provision, the plurality ignored the provision's obvi-
ous similarity with the EPA's "any other factor" exception. Given the
similarity between these exceptions, it is arguable that the RFOA provi-
sion, similar to the EPA's exception, precludes disparate impact liabil-
ity.224 Although the EPA and ADEA are analogous in only one provi-
sion, as compared to the similarities between Title VII and the ADEA,
the importance of the RFOA provision, which serves as a statutorily au-
thorized layer of protection for employers, advises against an automatic
application of Title VII principles to the ADEA'2
In addition, the plurality mischaracterized a fundamental historical dif-
ference between the two statutes: Congress amended the scope of Title
VII disparate impact liability in 1991 without similarly amending the
ADEA. 2' Although the Court interpreted this amendment to limitADEAdisarat imact ""221
ADEA disparate impact liability, there are several problems with this
construction. First, when Congress amended Title VII in 1991, it obvi-
ously knew that courts consistently interpreted the ADEA and Title VII
in haec verba, and therefore, Congress arguably drafted the amendment
to pertain only to Title VII.229 Second, Congress made several amend-
ments to the ADEA's procedural provisions yet did not amend the Act
223. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 639-40 (noting that the EPA's exception
provides additional support for opponents of ADEA disparate impact recovery).
224. See Krop, supra note 202, at 845-47 (asserting that the EPA's exception could be
applied to the ADEA context in light of one of the ADEA's central purposes to prohibit
arbitrary age discrimination); Manning, supra note 64, at 787-88 (remarking that propo-
nents of ADEA disparate impact recovery concede that the EPA-ADEA analogy is a
strong one). But see Marino, supra note 12, at 667-68 (arguing that the ADEA's defense is
narrower than the EPA's because the ADEA's exception contains the term "reasonable").
225. See Manning, supra note 64, at 781 (identifying the RFOA provision as one of the
fundamental distinctions between Title VII and the ADEA); Pontz, supra note 65, at 293-
94 (concluding that the RFOA provision "underscores the inappropriateness of applying
[disparate impact] theory to the ADEA").
226. See Allen et al., supra note 209, at 80-81 (submitting that Congress' failure to
amend the ADEA in 1991 is one of the strongest arguments against applying Title VII
disparate impact analysis to the ADEA).
227. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 240 (2005). The Court noted that because
the 1991 amendment involved only Title VII, the pre-1991 interpretation of Title VII dis-
parate impact liability could still be applied to the ADEA's identical language. Id.
228. See Allen et al., supra note 209, at 90 (concluding, prior to City of Jackson, that
the Court should reject ADEA disparate impact claims in part because Congress did not
amend the ADEA in 1991); Holmes, supra note 42, at 306.
229. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 304 (noting that when Congress amended Title VII in
1991, it knew that courts were repeatedly applying Title VII to the ADEA context). Pontz
further notes that "[t]o argue that Congress was not aware of the ADEA as it crafted the
1991 [Civil Rights Act] is to ignore the fact that Congress amended the ADEA by that
very same 1991 Civil Rights Act." Id. at 306. As Pontz recognizes, "Congress amended
the ADEA to provide the same statute of limitations and 'right to sue' notification proce-
dure under the ADEA as under Title VII." Id. at 306 n.247.
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to allow for disparate impact recovery.2° On the other hand, some com-
mentators have argued that Congress failed to explicitly provide for
ADEA disparate impact recovery in 1991 because it intended for the
courts to continue to resolve the issue. 3' Regardless of Congress' intent
in failing to amend ADEA disparate impact liability, however, the 1991
amendment clearly undermines the City of Jackson plurality's contention
that the two statutes contain identical language.
C. Justice O'Connor Properly Recognized the Differences Between Age
Discrimination and Other Forms of Discrimination
The ADEA's legislative history strongly supports Justice O'Connor's
view on the fundamental differences between age discrimination and
other forms of discrimination." For example, the Wirtz Report's find-
ings explicitly rejected any commonality between age and Title VII's pro-
tected classes.3 Instead, the Secretary concluded that age discrimination
is fundamentally different than other forms of discrimination because it
lacks the invidiousness of race and gender discrimination. Similarly,
during the congressional debates on the ADEA, supporters of the pro-
posed legislation consistently remarked that unfounded assumptions
about age and ability fueled employers' discrimination against older
workers. 26
230. Id. at 304 n.239 (noting that Congress amended the ADEA's statute of limitations
for filing private lawsuits).
231. See Eglit, supra note 222, at 1184 (contending that Congress demonstrated their
approval of pro-disparate impact interpretations of the ADEA because Congress never
explicitly rejected any of the holdings); Brett Ira Johnson, Note, Six of One, Half-Dozen of
Another: Mullin v. Raytheon Co. as a Representative of Federal Circuit Courts Erroneously
Distinguishing the ADEA from Title VII Regarding Disparate Impact Liability, 36 IDAHO
L. REV. 303, 332-33 (2000) (arguing that Congress' failure to amend the ADEA is not
instructive, particularly because Congress did not reject prior judicial interpretations al-
lowing for ADEA disparate impact recovery).
232- See supra Part III.C.
233. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 644 (asserting that the Wirtz Report
made a clear distinction between age and race discrimination); Note, The Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1967, 90 HARV. L. REv. 380, 383 (1976) (submitting that the
congressional debates on the ADEA echoed Secretary Wirtz's findings on the differences
between age and race discrimination) [hereinafter Harvard Note].
234. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 5-6.
235. See id. at 6 (remarking that age discrimination "differs greatly from ... discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, color, religion, or national origin, which is basically unrelated to
ability to perform work").
236. See, e.g., 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits) (remarking that
ignorance was the main cause of age discrimination in employment); id. at 31,256 (state-
ment of Sen. Young) (commenting that age discrimination stemmed from outdated con-
cepts regarding age and ability); id. at 34,742 (statement of Rep. Burke) (arguing that age
discrimination differed from the "insidious discrimination based on race or creed preju-
dices and bigotry").
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In addition, the differences between age discrimination and other forms
of discrimination must be examined in light of the purposes behind dispa-
rate impact theory.37 The disparate impact model rests, in part, on the
theory that because race and ability are inherently unrelated to each
other, Title VII should protect employees from even the most subtle and
subconscious acts of discrimination. 238 In contrast, one's age is often re-
lated to one's ability to perform in a particular job.239 As a result, an em-
ployment practice may be entirely reasonable because of its focus on job-
related factors notwithstanding its adverse effect on older workers.2l In
addition, disparate impact theory seeks to redress the cumulative effectsj • • • .• 241
of past discrimination. However, there is not an extensive history of
discrimination against older persons, and thus the disparate impact model
cannot be automatically applied to the ADEA.242
237. See Kenneth R. Davis, Age Discrimination and Disparate Impact: A New Look at
an Age-Old Problem, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 361, 375-76 (2004-2005) (examining the rationale
in Griggs and comparing the effects of race discrimination with age discrimination);
Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things is Not Like the Other: Analogizing Ageism to
Racism in Employment Discrimination Cases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839, 866-67, 875 (2004)
(analyzing the applicability of the disparate impact model to the ADEA context given the
differences between age and race discrimination).
238. See Davis, supra note 237, at 400-04; see also Pontz, supra note 65, at 302 (assert-
ing that the Court's decision in Griggs rests on the principle that there is no connection
between race and work performance).
239. Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 648; Pontz, supra note 65, at 302.
240. Kyle C. Barrentine, Comment, Disparate Impact and the ADEA: A Means to an
End or Justice?, 27 CUMB. L. REv. 1245, 1268-69 (1996-1997); see also Peter H. Schuck,
The Graying of Civil Rights Law: The Age Discrimination Act of 1975, 89 YALE L.J. 27, 37
(1979) (asserting that a facially neutral employment practice should "enjoy a very strong
presumption of reasonableness").
241. See Krop, supra note 202, at 850.
242. Harris, supra note 156, at 732; Pontz, supra note 65, at 306-09. Pontz further notes
that older workers have not encountered the life-long bias seen in other forms of discrimi-
nation. Pontz, supra note 65, at 307-08. Instead, victims of age discrimination "may have
benefitted [sic] when they were younger from such discrimination against other older
workers." Id. at 308. Summarizing the comparisons between the protected classes of the
ADEA and Title VII, one commentator has noted:
Age discrimination does not apply to a discrete and insular minority, but to individu-
als who may have had a full range of opportunities and advantages earlier in life. It
does not limit the employment opportunities available to a fixed class of people and
their descendants.... A remedial perspective therefore confronts no persistent effects
of age discrimination that need to be remedied.
Only an economic perspective can supply a justification for the ADEA.
GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: VISIONS OF EQUALITY
IN THEORY AND DOCTRINE 199 (2001).
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D. The ADEA's Text and Legislative History Demonstrate that the RFOA
Provision Serves to Preclude Disparate Impact Liability
Analyzing the text of the ADEA, Justice O'Connor's safe harbor in-
terpretation of the RFOA provision represents its most logical construc-
tion. 43 This interpretation is most consistent with one of the ADEA's
central purposes: eliminating arbitrary age discrimination. 4  Under the
safe harbor theory, an employer is not subject to ADEA liability unless it
intentionally discriminates on the basis of age.245 However, applying the
reasoning of the City of Jackson plurality, an employer could be held
liable based solely on the effects of a facially neutral employment prac-
tice.246 As a result, the plurality's interpretation significantly limits the
scope of the RFOA provision because it would no longer automatically
provide immunity to an employer basing its decisions on an employee's
work performance. 24' Although some courts and commentators have
rejected the safe harbor theory by arguing that the term "reasonable"
could be interpreted to codify the business necessity defense,2 48 it is more
likely-given the legislative history of the ADEA-that Congress in-
tended to prevent an employer from asserting an unreasonable justifica-
tion that is merely a pretext for intentional discrimination.249 In fact, the
attempted analogy between reasonable factors and business necessity is
implausible because many practices may be reasonable to an employer's
business but would not constitute a necessity. °
In addition, the ADEA's legislative history demonstrates that the
drafters intended to provide considerable leeway to an employer in deci-
sions concerning older workers.2 1 For example, Secretary Wirtz recom-
243. See Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 639 (contending that the RFOA provi-
sion is "logically inconsistent" with disparate impact recovery).
244. Krop, supra note 202, at 846-47 (examining the RFOA provision in light of the
ADEA's stated purposes).
245. Pontz, supra note 65, at 293-94.
246. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 236 n.6 (2005) (plurality opinion)
("[A]n employer who classifies his employees without respect to age may still be liable...
if such classification adversely affects the employee because of that employee's age .... ").
247. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 293-94 (asserting that the RFOA provision conflicts
with disparate impact theory because the theory allows employers to be held liable for
decisions based on factors independent of age).
248. See, e.g., Kaminshine, supra note 44, at 302 (contending that the RFOA provision
can be construed to incorporate disparate impact theory and the business necessity de-
fense); supra note 171 and accompanying text (noting that several courts have found a
correlation between "reasonable factors" and "business necessity").
249. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 252-53 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
250. Harris, supra note 156, at 730 n.70; Herbert & Shelton, supra note 65, at 641 (argu-
ing that the analogy between the RFOA provision and "business necessity" stretches the
definition of "reasonable").
251. See Harvard Note, supra note 233, at 400 (asserting that Congress intended to
allow employers to take age into account in certain circumstances); see also supra note 51
and accompanying text.
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mended noncoercive measures in response to institutional arrangements,
recognizing that employers often adopt such programs to achieve "effi-
ciency, equity, order, and improved fringe benefits. '' 2' 2 Thus, Secretary
Wirtz's recommendations demonstrate that the drafters of the ADEA
did not intend to subject an employer to liability in cases where its legiti-
mate business practices adversely affected older workers.23 Second,
while debating the proposed ADEA, Congress explicitly noted that the
legislation would not create difficulty for employers.n4 In fact, Congress
drafted the RFOA provision so as to provide an employer with flexibility
in making decisions based on the merit of its employees.2s Thus, the leg-
islative history demonstrates that Congress intended to allow employers
to use reasonable, non-age factors regardless of any subsequent disparate
impact on older workers.5 6
III. A CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE TO CITY OF JACKSON
Given the Supreme Court's erroneous interpretation of the availability
of disparate impact recovery under the ADEA,257 this Comment proposes
that Congress amend the ADEA to specifically preclude disparate impact
recovery.58 An ADEA amendment would restore the ADEA's original
purposes, define the purpose of the RFOA provision, and recognize the
historical differences between the ADEA and Title VII and their pro-
tected classes.
252. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 15.
253. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 299-300 (noting that the drafters of the ADEA sought
only to prohibit employment practices based on stereotypical assumptions about older
workers).
254. 113 CONG. REc. 31,254 (1967) (statement of Sen. Javits); see also id. at 34,746
(statement of Rep. Daniels) ("[T]he bill takes into full consideration the problems and
interests of employers."); cf Judith J. Johnson, Rehabilitate the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act: Resuscitate the "Reasonable Factors Other Than Age" Defense and the
Disparate Impact Theory, 55 HASTINGs L.J. 1399, 1429-30 (2004) (recognizing that Con-
gress intended the RFOA clause to provide a balanced approach for both employers and
employees).
255. Johnson, supra note 254, at 1430; see also H.R. REP. No. 90-805, at 7 (1967), re-
printed in 1967 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2213, 2219 (recognizing an employer's interest in achieving a
reasonable age balance).
256. Pontz, supra note 65, at 301; see also Markham v. Geller, 451 U.S. 945, 948-49
(1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (arguing that the lower court
erred in rejecting the employer's cost defense because the drafters of the ADEA did not
intend the statute to have a "restraining influence" on employers).
257. See supra Part II.
258. But see Sweeney, supra note 202, at 1577 (recommending that Congress amend
the ADEA to explicitly authorize disparate impact recovery); cf. Allen et al., supra note
209, at 91 (observing, prior to City of Jackson, that if the Court rejected ADEA disparate
impact recovery, Congress could amend the ADEA to authorize such claims).
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A. Draft Legislative Findings Recognizing Congress' Original Intent to
Prohibit Only Intentional Age Discrimination
In response to the City of Jackson plurality's interpretation of the
ADEA, this Comment's proposed amendment includes legislative find-
ings codifying Justice O'Connor's view on the original intent behind the
ADEA 59 The congressional findings would expressly acknowledge that
the ADEA's legislative history elucidates one clear purpose: it is unlaw-
ful for an to employer to adopt policies where age motivates an em-
ployer's decision.'60 In its findings, Congress would recognize that the
Wirtz Report served as the central foundation for the ADEA.2' The
legislative findings would identify Secretary Wirtz's crucial distinction
between "arbitrary" age discrimination and employer arrangements that
caused an adverse impact on older workers.62 As a result, the amend-
ment would settle the dispute over the meaning of arbitrary age discrimi-
nation16 by asserting that the drafters of the ADEA intended the legisla-
tion to target the motivation, not the effects, of an employment prac-
tice.2 In addition, the legislative findings would state that the plain
meaning of the ADEA's "because of ... age" clause adopts the Wirtz
Report's recommendations and prohibits only disparate treatment.265 In
sum, the legislative findings would assert that the City of Jackson ruling,
by allowing for an employer to be held liable even if a non-age factor
motivates its employment practice, undermined Congress' original intent
in passing the ADEA.
259. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 253 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(arguing that Congress did not intend to authorize disparate impact recovery under the
ADEA).
260. See Allen et al., supra note 209, at 90 (contending that Congress did not consider
the availability of disparate impact recovery when it enacted the ADEA); Pontz, supra
note 65, at 301 (arguing that Congress, in passing the ADEA, was preoccupied with pro-
hibiting intentional age discrimination, rather than policies causing an adverse impact on
older workers).
261. See Holmes, supra note 42, at 305 (referring to the Wirtz Report as the "founda-
tion upon which the ADEA was constructed").
262. WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 21-22 (distinguishing between arbitrary age
discrimination and institutional arrangements with adverse effect on older workers); see
supra notes 44-47, 203-04 and accompanying text.
263. See supra note 44 (outlining the arguments regarding the meaning of "arbitrary"
age discrimination).
264. See Blumrosen, supra note 44, at 91-93 (recognizing that Congress looked at the
motivation, not the effects, of an employer's practices); Pontz, supra note 65, at 301 (argu-
ing that Congress intended to prohibit intentional discrimination, not facially neutral em-
ployment practices with an adverse impact on older workers).
265. See Krop, supra note 202, at 842-44 (commenting on the inherent inconsistency
between the ADEA's "because of ... age" clause and disparate impact theory); supra
notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
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B. Define the Role of the RFOA Provision as a Safe Harbor From ADEA
Disparate Impact Liability
In addition, this Comment's proposed ADEA amendment would reject
City of Jackson's interpretation of the RFOA provision as a defense to
both disparate impact and disparate treatment claims26 The amendment
would expressly provide that the RFOA clause Provides a safe harbor
from, not a defense to, disparate impact liability. Therefore, a plaintiff
could only survive an employer's summary judgment motion by proving a
prima facie case of intentional age discrimination; the employer would
then be able to rebut the plaintiff's case by producing evidence that it
used a reasonable, non-age factor.26' Additionally, a congressional
amendment would revive Hazen Paper's interpretation of the RFOA
provision to allow employers to consider any RFOA, including those
factors that correlate with age. 69 In sharp contrast to the City of Jackson
plurality's broad interpretation of the ADEA,2T° Congress could return
the ADEA to its original purpose of prohibiting only those practices
based on erroneous assumptions about older workers.27' In addition, the
amendment would reflect the fact that Congress originally drafted the
RFOA clause so as to provide employers considerable leeway in adopt-
ing employment practices. 2 Thus, the amendment would adopt Justice
O'Connor's view that the RFOA provision prevents an employer from
asserting an unreasonable, non-age factor that serves merely as a pretext
273for intentional discrimination.
266. See supra Part I.C.4.
267. See Krop, supra note 202, at 844-45 (arguing that the RFOA provision shields an
employer from liability as long as age bias does not motivate its employment decision or
practice).
268. See Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 252 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
269. See Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 611-12 (1993) (holding that an em-
ployer should not be held liable under the ADEA where it uses a non-age factor "even if
the motivating factor is correlated with age").
270. See supra note 246 and accompanying text. But see Benjes, supra note 197, at 246-
50 (contending that the Court's broad interpretation of the RFOA provision in City of
Jackson will allow employers a successful defense to most disparate impact claims under
the ADEA).
271. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 2 (defining arbitrary age discrimination as
the "rejection [of older workers] because of assumptions about the effect of age on their
ability to do a job when there is in fact no basis for these assumptions").
272. See Johnson, supra note 254, at 1430 (recognizing that Congress intended the
RFOA provision, in part, to allow employers to terminate older workers who were unable
to perform their jobs); supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text.
273. See City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 253 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (asserting that the
RFOA provision "prevent[s] the employer from gaining the benefit of the statutory safe
harbor by offering an irrational justification"); supra text accompanying note 249.
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C. Acknowledge the Significant Differences Between the ADEA and Title
VII
In addition, an amendment to the ADEA would recognize the funda-
mental differences between Title VII and the ADEA.7  First, an
amendment would acknowledge that Congress rejected adding age as a
protected status to Title VII when it debated the Civil Rights Act of
1964.275 More importantly, the proposed legislation would identify the
central reason that Congress rejected the age amendments: in contrast to
race and gender discrimination, there was insufficient evidence regarding
the problem of age discrimination in employment. 276 Therefore, the
amendment would recognize that although Title VII and the ADEA
share a common purpose, they have entirely separate legislative histo-
ries.2" Second, the proposed amendment would point to Congress'
broadening of Title VII disparate impact liability in 1991.278 The amend-
ment would acknowledge that the 1991 amendments to the Civil Rights
Act were even more significant, given that courts were interpreting Title
VII and the ADEA in haec verba.2 79 As a result, the amendment would
reject the City of Jackson plurality's argument that the pre-1991 interpre-
tation of Title VII disparate impact liability applies to the ADEA. °
Finally, an amendment to the ADEA would recognize the "qualita-
tive" differences between age and the protected classes under Title VII.28'
First, the amendment would acknowledge that there is not an entrenched
history of discrimination against older persons, as compared to race and
274. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 304-06 (discussing Congress' 1991 amendment ex-
panding Title VII disparate impact liability and its impact on the ADEA disparate impact
debate); supra Part II.B.
275. See 110 CONG. REc. 2596-99, 9911-13 (1964) (rejecting the age amendments of
Congressman Dowdy and Senator Smathers).
276. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
277. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 298 (examining the varying histories behind the
ADEA and Title VII); Andrea B. Short, Comment, Discriminating Among Discrimination:
The Appropriateness of Treating Reverse Age Discrimination Differently from Reverse Race
Discrimination, 83 N.C. L. REv. 1065, 1070-74 (2005) (commenting on the different histo-
ries and purposes behind the ADEA and Title VII).
278. See supra note 81 (examining the effects of the 1991 amendment on the burden-
shifting analysis in a Title VII disparate impact claim).
279. See Pontz, supra note 65, at 304 (rejecting the argument that Congress was not
aware of the ADEA when it amended Title VII liability in 1991); supra note 229 and ac-
companying text.
280. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
281. Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228, 253-55 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring);
see also Davis, supra note 237, at 375-76 (comparing the effects of race discrimination with
age discrimination); Reaves, supra note 237, at 866-67, 875 (examining ADEA disparate
impact recovery in light of the differences between age and race discrimination); supra
Part II.C.
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gender discrimination.m The legislation would recognize that the Wirtz
Report found no evidence of animus or intolerance of older workers."3
As a result, Congress would affirm that the central purpose of disparate
impact theory - eliminating the perpetuation of discrimination -is en-
tirely inapplicable to the ADEA context. 2 Second, the amendment
would recognize that, in contrast to race or gender, one's age may be re-
lated to his or her ability to perform a job.8 An amendment would as-
sert that the cost of many employment benefits increase with an em-
ployee's rise in seniority; thus, an employment practice reasonably based
on cost savings may disproportionately affect older workers.26 There-
fore, an ADEA amendment would ensure that an employer can consider
non-age factors, such as merit and cost, regardless of the adverse effect
on older workers.27
IV. CONCLUSION
In the disparate impact debate, the City of Jackson plaintiffs lost the
battle but won the war. Although the Supreme Court ultimately affirmed
the dismissal of the plaintiffs' disparate impact claim, the case was a con-
siderable victory for future ADEA plaintiffs who are no longer limited to
recovering under a theory of disparate treatment. To restore the original
intent behind the ADEA, however, this Comment proposed that Con-
gress respond to City of Jackson by amending the ADEA to preclude
disparate impact recovery. Above all, a congressional response to the
Supreme Court's opinion would more effectively recognize that in many
employment decisions, age is more than just a number.
282. See Manning, supra note 64, at 787 (recognizing that, in contrast to racial or gen-
der-based discrimination, there is no extended history of stigma or barriers levied against
older persons); supra note 242 and accompanying text.
283. See WIRTZ REPORT, supra note 41, at 5-6 (noting that an employer's discrimina-
tion based on religion or race stems from sheer prejudice, whereas there are no such
prejudices against older workers); see also supra text accompanying notes 43-44.
284. See supra notes 241-42 and accompanying text.
285. See Krop, supra note 202, at 850 (commenting on the "inherent correlation be-
tween age and ability"); supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
286. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. at 259 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Given the myriad
ways in which legitimate business practices can have a disparate impact on older workers,
it is hardly surprising that Congress declined to subject employers to civil liability based
solely on such effects.").
287. See Krop, supra note 202, at 845 (submitting that the ADEA allows an employer
to base its decision on any reasonable factor, even one that correlates with age).
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